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1.  Introduction 
    This study employs an OLG model in which allocation of the fiscal burden among generations, 
including future generations, is determined by political power. We demonstrate how a change in 
intergenerational altruism and political power can change the political regime and outcome. This will 
reconfigure the allocation of the tax burden and, therefore, the utility of each generation.   
The Japanese outstanding public debt (as a proportion of the GDP) is now the largest among 
developing countries, primarily because of  the  changing age structure of the population. The 
situation is expected to worsen, with social security payments continuing to increase at the rate of 
about 1 trillion yen per year. There needs to be a drastic change in public financing if Japan’s fiscal 
sustainability is to continue into the future. 
    According to Masujima, Shimazawa, and Murakami (2009), if the current situation were to 
continue, the lifetime net public burden (lifetime net public burden (life time tax – life transfers) 
divided by lifetime wages) of the generation aged 90+ will be -7% while that of the future generation 
will be 51.4%. This means that  the lifetime public burden of  the  future generations will be 60 
percentage points more than that of the 90+ generation. This intergenerational inequality needs to be 
corrected.   
However,  correction of this inequality and the fiscal policy change required  have  proved 
extremely difficult. One source of the difficulty may be the relative political influence of the retired 
and working generations, due to factors such as voter turnout. If each generation votes to increase 
net government transfer, such as through higher pensions and lower taxes, resistance to reducing 
pensions or lessening the tax burden of the working generation may be a reflection of the older 
generation  having greater  political influence. In fact, the numbers  of  the  retired generation are 
increasing while the size of the younger generation is decreasing as a result of lower fertility. This 
means that the relative proportion of retired people among all voters is increasing while that of the 
younger generation is decreasing. The political influence of the older generation is even more 
pronounced due to the difference in voter turnout (Figure 1). The older generation can use the 2 
 
political process to shift the burden to the working generation.   
In addition, the life-cycle hypothesis suggests that because the time horizons of the retirees are 
shorter, they are subject to stronger incentives to issue public debt and leave the liability to future 
generations. This, together with their relatively greater political influence, can explain why public 
debt continues to grow and political will to change the situation is lacking.   
    The situation may change if we take into account the fact that retirees may have children. The 
children of these retirees are the current working generation, and their children are the grandchildren 
of the retirees. Intergenerational altruism may make the retirees act in a way calculated to benefit the 
working or future generations even if such a choice may reduce the level of their own consumption. 
On the other hand, such intergenerational altruism may not be enough if the retirees without children 
outnumber those with children. They may maneuver the political situation into an outcome that 
increases the burden of the working and future generations. However, even in such a scenario, it may 
be possible for them to form a political coalition with the working generation, ensuring that the 
working generation is  better  off (Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation 
Regime, Section 2). This suggests that while the current electoral system does not include the future 
generation in the process (because of the minimum voting age), the future generation’s well-being 
will be reflected in the process through the actions of their parents, if intergenerational altruism 
exists. Of course, in order that they cooperate, there  must be sufficient benefit for retirees with 
children from making the future generations better  off. If there is no such benefit, the  political 
outcome will be determined by the Retirees Cooperation Regime (see Section 2). The extent of 
intergenerational altruism will determine which of these potential coalitions come into being. 
Since the 1990s, both empirical and theoretical political economic approaches have been taken 
with regard to the politics of public finance (Alesina and Perotti 1998, Persson and Tabellini 2000, 
Shi and Svensson 2006, to name a few). Several sources of political factors have been identified: (1) 
the political cycle of fiscal policy generated by the reelection motive in politicians and a change in 
the majority party (Rogoff 1990, Kneebone and McKenzie 2001, Foucault et al. 2008), (2) a change 
of government and strategic motive (Persson and Svensson 1989, Tabellini and Alesina 1990, Crain 
and Tollison 1993), and (3) the common pool problem (Alesina and Drazen 1991, Ihori and Itaya 
2001).  The common pool problem has been identified as an important political source of 
overspending (resulting in a negative fiscal budget). Income inequality and racial bias (Woo 2003) 
and the relationship between federal and state (central and local) governments (Rodden 2002, Doi 
and Ihori 2002, Schaltegger and Feld 2009) have also been suggested as significant factors.   
There has been no study of the relationship between the political regime and fiscal policy, to the 
best of our knowledge. In this paper, we use the OLG framework with two generations (working and 
retired) and three groups (working, retired with children, and retired without children). The three 
groups are political voting blocks. The framework allows us to analyze the relationship between the 3 
 
political regime, defined by the relative political power of voting groups, and the political outcome, 
which determines fiscal policy. The fiscal policy defines tax and transfers, including pensions.   
In Section 2, we present an OLG model with two generations and three voting blocks and 
characterize the possible political regimes and outcomes. Section 3 consists of a simple analysis by 
simulation and application to the current situation in Japan. We summarize the results and discuss 
questions for future research in Section 4.   
   
2.    Model 
(1)  Household 
There are two generations involved in each period t (t=0, 1, 2,…), working generation t and 
retired generation t－1 (which was the working generation in period t). Working generation t earns a 
lifetime wage t W , has lifetime consumption t C   and pays tax  ) (t Tt   in period t. Lifetime consumption
t C is  the  sum of consumption while working and after retirement. We assume that the wage is 
exogenous and the interest rate is zero. The lifetime consumption of working generation t will be   
 
), ( ) ( t T W t C t t t − =                                                                 (1) 
 
where  t t t W s s T ) ( ) ( θ ≡   defines the lifetime tax burden rate of working generation t in the periods. 
On the other hand, the retirees t-1 in period t can recover some of the tax paid in period t-1 by 
issuing bonds. That is to say, retirees t-1 can reduce their lifetime tax burden to ) ( 1 t Tt− in period t. We 
can define generation t-1’s “profit” in period t as ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 t T t T t t t − − − − ≡ ϕ . Of course, if this generation 
must  shoulder a larger  tax burden in period t, it will be making a  negative profit  (a loss),
0 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 < − − ≡ − − t T t T t t t ϕ . Accordingly, retired generation t-1 must revise its lifetime consumption in 
period t as well, 
 
, )) 1 ( ( ) ( 1 1 1 t t t t t T W t C ϕ + − − = − − −                                                       
(2) 
 
where generation t-1’s lifetime tax burden rate in period t, ) ( 1 t t− θ , is defined as 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( − − − ≡ t t t W t t T θ  
 
(2) Government budget constraint   
For ease of analysis, we assume there is no government expenditure (other than transfer) so that 
all debt incurred in a period is assumed to be repaid in the following period. Denoting the (planned) 
tax on generation t+1 in period t as 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( + + + ≡ t t t W t t T θ , public debt as t D , and population size as t N , 
we have the following government budgetary constraint. 
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where  1 / − ≡ t t t N N n is the population growth rate andG is the rate of wage increase. Debt for this 
period will be whatever is not paid from the debt of the previous period, 
[ ] ) ( )) 1 ( ) ( ( 1 1 1 1 t T N t T t T N D D t t t t t t t + − − − = − − − +                                            (4) 
 
(3) Household Utility 
In addition, females aged around 40 can give birth to children and men over 40  can have 
children. Therefore, we assume that the working generation t is made up of people in the working 
period, which means it includes people who have not finished having children. We are not able to 
categorize (exactly) members of the working generation into groups of those who have children and 
those who do not. The retirees, on the other hand, can be divided into two groups, those with 
children and those without. We assume proportion  5 . 0 > t π have children (See Figure 2). Thus, 
retirees are heterogeneous, while the working generation is homogeneous. 
We define generation j’s utility from lifetime consumption as  j j C v log =   and assume that 
parents and children are mutually altruistic. We can define the utilities of working generation t and 
retires t-1 with and without children.   




t U 1 [ ] [ ] [ ], ) ( 1 log ) ( 1 log ) ( 1 log 1
2
1 t t t t t t t + − − + − + − θ δ π θ δ θ                                  (5) 
 
Where  δ   measures how much parents care about their children (forward altruism). The first term is 
utility derived from their own consumption, the second term from that of their children (the working 
generation), and third term from that of their grandchildren (the future generation). Additionally, the 
future generation is made up of the children of the working generation, and only proportion t π   of 
them have children. 
    Next, we define the utility of retirees without children,   
 
   = −
nc
t U 1 [ ] ) ( 1 log 1 t t− −θ                                                              (6) 
 
    This is equivalent to equation (6),  less the last two terms, which represented utility from 
children and grandchildren’s consumption. 
Finally, we define the utility of the working generation, 
 
     = t U [ ] [ ] [ ], ) ( 1 log ) ( 1 log ) ( 1 log 1 1 t t t t t t t + − − + − + − θ δ π θ θ σ                                 (7) 
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whereσ measures how much a child cares about its parents’ utility (backward altruism). The first 
term is utility from parent’s consumption, the second term is utility from own consumption, and the 
third term is utility from children’s consumption. 
 
(4) Objective function of the political process 
Let us consider the extent of political influence, as in, for instance, turnout at an election, in 
each period for each generation. We will denote by  ) (t sk   the  extent of generation  k’s  political 
activism in period t. We now define the total political power for each group. Group 1 consists of 
retirees with children,  whose total political power is 1 1 1 1 ) ( − − − ≡ t t t N t s V π . Group 2 are the retirees 
without children,  and  the group’s total  political power is 1 1 1 2 ) ( ) 1 ( − − − − ≡ t t t N t s V π . Finally, Group 3 
consists of the working generation, the total political power of which is t t N t s V ) ( 3 ≡ . 
We assume that the political objective is to maximize the utility of the group j (j = 1, 2, 3）that has 
the majority. Thus, if Group 1 (retirees with children) is in the majority, the objective function will 
be 
child
t U 1 − , which we will call case 1. 
 
1)  “Retirees with children Independent Majority Regime” 
t t t t t t t t N t s N t s N t s ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − > − − − − − − π π   holds, and   
child
t t U case W 1 ) 1 ( − =                                                               (8) 
 
Since we assumed that the majority of retirees have children, 5 . 0 1 > − t π , it will always be the 
case that  2 1 V V > ,  meaning  that  Group 2 will never be the majority  by itself. The only other 
possibility is that of Group 3 obtaining a majority; we will refer to this situation as case 2. 
 
2)  “Working generation Independent Majority Regime” 
1 1 ) ( ) ( − − > t t t t N t s N t s   holds, and 
t t U case W = ) 2 (
   
                                                              (9) 
 
Now we consider a situation in which none of the three groups can obtain the majority by itself. 
A group will form a coalition with another group that will enable it to attain the highest level of 
own utility (defined by equations (5)－(7)).  The objective function when a coalition achieves 
majority will be the weighted average of its coalition members, where the weights reflect total 
political power. Denoting the utility of group k by k U , the objective function will be   
 
i i j j t U V U V W + =  
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Note that it is very unlikely that there will be a coalition of the working generation and retirees 




only need to consider the following two cases with cooperation (See Figure 3). 
3)  “Retirees Cooperation Regime” 
1 1 ) ( ) ( − − > t t t t N t s N t s   and  t t t t t t t t N t s N t s N t s ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − < − − − − − − π π   holds, and 
  
nc
t t t t
child
t t t t t U N t s U N t s case W 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 )( ( ) ( ) 3 ( − − − − − − − − − + = π π                                      (10) 




t t U U 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( − − − − − + ∝ π π  
4)  “Working generation + Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” 
t t t t t t t t N t s N t s N t s ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 + < − − − − − − − π π holds, and 
t t t
child
t t t t t U N t s U N t s case W ) ( ) ( ) 4 ( 1 1 1 1 + = − − − − π                                            (11) 
            t t t
child
t t U n U ρ π + ∝ − − 1 1  
 
where ) ( / ) ( 1 t s t s t t t − ≡ ρ   is the relative political influence of the working generation as compared to 
that of retirees. Note that the utility of retirees with children must be higher in case 4 than in case 3 
so that the objective function of case 4 may be actually as defined by equation (11). That is, the 
following relationship must hold in addition: 
 




t − − >                                                       (12) 
 
3.  Simple Analysis and Application 
(1) Simple Analysis: 1 = t π ,  1 < = n nt   and  1 = t ρ  
There are no retirees without children, so the objective function is determined by the relative 
size of the working generation and the group of retirees (who all have children). Since,  t t N N > −1
holds, case 1 will be true, and the objective function is given by (8). 
    The allocation for each generation in period t  can be arrived at  by solving the following 
constrained optimization problem defined by equations (3) and (8), 
 
                                                   
2  A coalition of the working generation and retirees without children requires the following two conditions in order 
to hold: 1) The utility of the working generation from cooperating with the retirees without children is higher than 
from cooperating with retirees with children, and 2) The utility of retirees without children will be higher from 
cooperating with retirees with children than from cooperating with the working generation. We show in Section 3 that 
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Specifically, we obtain the following conditions on  )) ( ), ( ), ( ( 1 1 t t t t t t + − θ θ θ , where  λ   is the 
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Using equations (4)  and  (13), we obtain  the dynamic equation for outstanding  public debt 
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Ignoring the upper bounds of  t d   and  ) (t t θ   for the present, we can derive the following 
statements from equation (14). 










>   then outstanding public debt  t d   will converge (to a value),   8 
 










<   then outstanding public debt  t d   will diverge. 
 
By taking the  upper  bounds of  t d   and  ) (t t θ into account, we can derive the following 
proposition from equation (13).   












≡ Γ < , then the political game defined in Section 2 is 
unsustainable.   
 
(2) Application to Japan   
Assuming  1 1 < − t π , we can apply the framework presented in Section 2 to Japan. We divide the 
population from age 20 to age 89 into two groups: working generation t (20 to 54 year olds）and 
retired generations t－1 (55 to 89 year olds). The minimum voting age in Japan is 20. Using the 
figures published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (Population by Age, 2008), 
we get approximations  = t N 58,000,000 and  = −1 t N 45,000,000, and  = t n 1.29.  The Population 
Projection by National Institute of Population and Social Security Research estimates (mid-level 
estimation as of 2006) that  population growth up  to 2100 is -  0.7% per annual, which implies 
= − = +
35
1 ) 007 . 0 1 ( t n 0.78. 
    Given these values, we can identify the following two Independent Majority Regimes (cases 1 
and 2) according to relative political influence  ) ( / ) ( 1 t s t s t t t − ≡ ρ , independent of values  δ   and  σ  
from equations (8) and (9). 
 
1)  31 . 0 / ) 1 2 ( 1 = − < − t t t n π ρ : “Retirees with children Independent Majority Regime” 
 
2)  776 . 0 / 1 = > t t n ρ : “Working generation Independent Majority Regime” 
 
For other values ( 776 . 0 31 . 0 < < t ρ ) it will be either case 3 (Retirees Cooperation Regime) or 
case 4 (Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime), according to 
conditions (10) and (12). 
We can arrive at the allocation determined by the political process by solving a constrained 
optimization problem as we did to get (13). We optimize equation (3) subject to the constraints given 
by (10) or (11). 
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Given condition (12), we see that it will be Retirees Cooperation Regime or Working generation 
and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime,  according to the  relative size of equation (5) 
determined by (15) and (16). The condition depends on values of  δ ,  σ , and  t ρ , which is too 
complicated to analyze analytically. 
 
We resort to simulation for the characterization. We calculate condition (5) for values ofδ ,  σ , 
and  t ρ   by increment of 0.05 for ranges  1 0 < <δ ,  1 0 < <σ , and  77 . 0 31 . 0 < < t ρ .  The  2005 
White Paper on the National Lifestyle (Cabinet Office) states that the proportion of households of 
20-49 year olds with children was 69.4%  in 1980 and 53.2%  in 2000. Thus,  we assume the 
proportion of retirees with children to be  1 − t π =0.7 and that of the working generation with children 
to be  t π = 0.53. The outstanding public debt as proportion of GDP was 190% in 2009. We use this, 
divided by 35 years (age group in a generation) for  ) /( t t t W N D   in equation (15). We assume  1 = G  
and  25 . 0 ) 1 ( 1 = − − t t θ . 
 
The simulation results are summarized in Table 1.  The blank cell  denotes  the  Retirees 
Cooperation Regime. For instance, the Retirees Cooperation Regime will be selected when (δ ,σ ) = 
(0.5, 0.5) (blank cell), independent of the value of t ρ . 10 
 
A number in each cell denotes the upper bound of  t ρ   for a Working generation and Retirees 
with children Cooperation Regime to come into existence. For instance, the number 0.5 appears in 
cell (δ ,σ ) = (0.7, 0.7), meaning that for (δ ,σ ) = (0.7, 0.7), the Working generation and Retirees 
with children Cooperation Regime will exist when  t ρ ＜0.5 and the Retirees Cooperation Regime 
will when  t ρ ＞0.5. 
According to the simulation, if the value for Japan is ( t ρ ,δ ,σ ) = (0.45, 0.8, 0.4), the Retirees 
Cooperation Regime is in existence. However, we need to be more careful about parameterσ , which 
appears only in the working generation’s utility function (7). The parameter is not relevant for the 
utility functions of the retirees, (5) and (6). 
Table 1 shows that the Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime will 
prevail if the parameter value  σ   is equal to or greater than 0.55. The simulation also shows that 
) (t t θ declines and the utility of the working generation increases as  σ   increases above 0.55 (See 
Table 2). 
This is because the tax burden  ) ( 1 t t− θ   of the retirees with children will be heavier  if  they 
cooperate with the working generation than if they cooperate with retirees without children, when 
the working generation’s value for retirees’ (parents’) utility very low. Even if  σ   is as high as 0.55, 
the Retiree Cooperation Regime will be selected if  t ρ is 0.6 and not 0.45. As with the previous 
situation, if the relative political influence of the working generation is greater, then the tax burden 
) ( 1 t t− θ   of the retirees with children will be larger if they cooperate with the working generation than 
if they cooperate with retirees without children. 
Thus, if the situation in Japan is ( t ρ ,δ ,σ ) = (0.6, 0.8, 0.4), then we need to increase  σ   to 
make it equal to or above 0.6. That is, by increasingσ , caring more about the well-being of parents, 
to levels determined by t ρ , the working generation can cooperate with the retirees with children and 
be better off themselves. 
 
(3)  Effect of Demeny voting 
In this section,  we will examine the implications of the so-called Demeny voting. Demeny 
proposed that children (all those currently below the voting age) be given a vote but parents be made 
to vote on their behalf (Demeny 1986, Aoki and Vaithianathan 2009） 。 
We use parameter  ξ   to denote the extent of extension of voting rights to children (how low 
the minimum age  should be). We adjust equation (11)  accordingly,  and the political objective 
function becomes, 
 
   ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − − − − − − + + − < t t t t t t t t t n N t s N t s N t s ξ π π   holds, and 
t t t t
child
t t t U n n U case W ) 1 ( ) 5 ( 1 1 1 + − − + + = ξ ρ π                                              (17) 
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If the Retirees Cooperation Regime is currently prevailing in Japan, we will call the situation 
given by equations  (17)  and (18)  the Demeny  voting +  Working generation and Retirees with 
children Cooperation Regime. 
 




t − − >                                                       (18) 
 
As in the previous section, we will find the values of intergenerational altruism and relative 
political influence that may change the regime from that of Retirees Cooperating to that of Demeny 
voting + Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperating. The results of the simulation 
are summarized in Table 3. The parameters (δ ,σ , t ρ ) were increased in increments of 0.02. We 
assumed the voting age was lowered to 10, meaning that there would be 10 new age groups. Since 
both the working and retired generation each contain 35 age groups (20 to 54 and 55 to 89), we set 
parameter  ξ to 10/35.   
We can see from Table 3 that if the current situation in Japan is summarized by ( t ρ ,δ ,σ ) = 
(0.45, 0.8, 0.4), then the society will become one with Demeny voting + Working generation and 
Retirees with children Cooperating when  σ   is equal or greater to 0.96. We can also see from the 
calculation results presented in Table 4 that when the regime switches at  σ = 0.96, the working 
generation’s lifetime tax burden rate  ) (t t θ decreases and its utility increases. 
 
4.    Summary and Future Research 
We examined an OLG with two generations, the working and the retired, divided into three 
groups, working, retired with children, and retired without children, where allocation of government 
funding is determined by the relative political power (votes) of the group. We examined how the 
majority or majority coalition depends on political power and the  extent of intergenerational 
altruism. 
We observed that by caring more about their parents (more backward altruism), the working 
generation can change the political outcome from that of Retirees Cooperating (retirees with and 
without children voting  together) to that of Working generation and Retirees with children 
Cooperating. The tax burden of the working generation will be lighter, and the working generation 
will be better off. 
We undertook simulation of a situation in which the voting age is lowered to 10 but parents vote 
on behalf of voters under 20 (Demeny  voting). The regime change from Retirees Cooperating 
(retirees with and without children voting together) to Working generation and Retirees Cooperating 
will occur for higher levels of intergenerational altruism and with less relative political influence of 
the working generation. The switch will lighten  the tax burden of the working generation and 
increase their utility. 12 
 
There are several assumptions that we hope to relax in future research. We assumed that retirees 
without children did not care about other generations at all, while retirees with children care not only 
about their children but also about their grandchildren. We also assumed that population growth rate, 
wages, and interest rates are exogenous. 
   13 
 
References   
・Alesina, A., and Drazen, A. (1991）“Why are stabilizations delayed ?”American Economic Review 
81 (5), pp1170-1188. 
・Alesina, A., Perotti, R., and Tavares, J. (1998) “The political economy of fiscal adjustments,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp197-266. 
・Aoki, R., and Vaithianathan, R. (2009) “Is Demeny Voting the Answer to Low Fertility in Japan?” 
Center of Intergenerational Studies Discussion Paper No. 435. 
・Crain, W. M., and Tollison, R. D.(1993) “Time inconsistency and fiscal policy: Empirical analysis 
of U.S. States, 1969-89,” Journal of Public Economics 51, pp153-159. 
・Demeny, P. (1986) “Pronatalist Policies in Low-Fertility Countries: Patterns, Performance and 
Prospects,” Population and Development Review 12, pp335-358. 
・Doi, T., and Ihori, T. (2002) “Fiscal reconstruction and local interest groups in Japan,” Journal of 
the Japanese and International Economies 16, pp492-511. 
・Foucault, M., Madies, T., and Paty, S. (2008) “Public spending interactions and local politics. 
Empirical evidence from French municipalities,” Public Choice 137, pp57-80. 
・Ihori, T., and Itaya, J.(2001) “A dynamic model of fiscal reconstruction,” European Journal of 
Political Economy 17 (4), pp779-797. 
・Kneebone, R. D., and McKenzie, K. J.(2001) “Electoral and partisan cycles in fiscal policy: An 
examination of Canadian Provinces,” International Tax and Public Finance 8, pp753-774. 
・Masujima, M., Shimasawa, M., and Murakami, T. (2009) “Study on Generational Accounting 
Model with the Social Security System,” ESRI Discussion Paper Series No.217. [ in Japanese ] 
・Persson, T., and Svensson, L. E.O. (1989) “Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: 
Policy with time in consistent preferences,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (2), pp325-345. 
・ Persson, T., and Tabellini, G. (2000) Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. MIT Press. 
・Rodden, J. (2002) “The dilemma of fiscal federalism: Grants and fiscal performance around the 
world,” American Journal of Political Science 46 (3), pp670-687. 
・Rogoff, K. (1990) “Equilibrium political budget cycles,” American Economic Review 80 (1), 
pp21-36. 
・Schaltegger, C. A., and Feld, L. P. (2009) “Are fiscal adjustments less successful in decentralized 
governments ?” European Journal of Political Economy 25, pp115-123. 
・Schaltegger, C. A., and Feld, L. P. (2009) “Do large cabinets favor large governments ? Evidence 
on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons,” Journal of Public Economics 83, pp35-47. 
・ Shi, M., and Svensson, J.(2006) “Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?” 
Journal of Public Economics 90, pp1367-1389. 14 
 
・Tabellini, G., and Alesina, A. (1990) “Voting on the budget deficit,” American Economic Review 
80 (1), pp37-49. 
・Woo, J. (2003) “Economic, political, and institutional determinants of public deficits,” Journal of 
Public Economics 87, pp387-426. 








































α G n nG
G n



















+ + + +








) 1 ( ) 1 (













                      (A1) 
 




































































































































































































+ + + +




















) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (






















                        (A2) 
 
Obtain the eigen value  Ω and vector  Ξ  of the matrix as follows is straightforward: 

































We define the initial value by,   
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Figure 1: Election turnout rate by age group   
 
Source:  “The Association for Promoting Fair Elections” http://www.akaruisenkyo.or.jp/ 
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Figure 3: Cooperation among generations 
 
 
                                               Retirees t－1 without children 
   
 
      Retirees t－1 with children   
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Table 1:  “Retirees Cooperation Regime” vs “ Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” 
 
    σ  
δ  
    0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25  0.3  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.55  0.6  0.65  0.7  0.75  0.8  0.85  0.9  0.95  1 
0.05                                                                                 
0.1                                                                                 
0.15                                                                                 
0.2                                                                                 
0.25                                                                                 
0.3                                                                                 
0.35                                                                                 
0.4                                                                                 
0.45                                                                                 
0.5                                                                              0.35 
0.55                                                                  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.55 
0.6                                                          0.35  0.4  0.45  0.55  0.7  0.75 
0.65                                                  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.55  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.7                                          0.35  0.4  0.45  0.5  0.6  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.75                                      0.35  0.4  0.45  0.55  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.8                                  0.35  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.85                          0.35  0.35  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.9                          0.35  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
0.95                      0.35  0.4  0.5  0.55  0.7  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
1                  0.35  0.4  0.45  0.55  0.65  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75  0.75 
Note: A blank cell means that the “Retirees Cooperation Regime” will be selected. The above figures represent the upper bounds of ρt, under which “Working generation and Retirees 
with children Cooperation Regime” will be selected. For example, the figure 0.5 of (δ, σ) = (0.5, 0.5) means that “Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation 
Regime” will be selected if ρt  ＜  0.5 and “Retirees Cooperation Regime” will be selected if ρt  ＞  0.5. 20 
 
Table 2:“Retirees Cooperation Regime”⇒“Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” 
          Lifetime tax rate and Utility for each generation by change ofσ : ( t ρ ,δ ) = (0.45, 0.8) 
 
   
σ  
0.4  0.55  0.6  0.65  0.7  0.75  0.8  0.85  0.9  0.95  1 
Lifetime tax rate of Retired generation ( ) ( 1 t t− θ )  -0.656    -0.148    -0.168    -0.187    -0.206    -0.225    -0.243    -0.261    -0.278    -0.296    -0.312   
Lifetime tax rate of Working generation ( ) (t t θ )  0.280    0.004    0.014    0.025    0.035    0.045    0.055    0.065    0.075    0.084    0.093   
Lifetime tax rate of Future generation ( ) ( 1 t t+ θ )  0.610    0.460    0.466    0.471    0.477    0.482    0.488    0.493    0.498    0.503    0.508   
Utility of Retired generation with children (
child
t U 1 − )  -0.078    -0.074    -0.069    -0.065    -0.061    -0.058    -0.055    -0.052    -0.050    -0.049    -0.047   
Utility of Retired generation without children (
nc
t U 1 − )  0.504  0.138  0.155  0.171  0.187  0.203  0.218  0.232  0.245  0.259  0.272 
Utility of Working generation ( t U )  -0.526    -0.189    -0.187    -0.184    -0.179    -0.174    -0.167    -0.158    -0.149    -0.138    -0.127   
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Table  3:“Retirees  Cooperation Regime” vs.  “Demeny voting  +  Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation 
Regime” 
 
    σ  
δ  
    0.02 - 0.76  0.78  0.8  0.82  0.84  0.86  0.88  0.9  0.92  0.94  0.96  0.98  1 
0.02 - 0.74 
                          0.76 
                       
0.4 
0.78 
                     
0.44  0.76 
0.8 
                   
0.5  0.76  0.76 
0.82 
                 
0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.84 
               
0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.86 
             
0.54  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.88 
           
0.48  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.9 
         
0.44  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.92 
       
0.4  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.94 
     
0.36  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.96 
   
0.34  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
0.98 
   
0.52  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
1 
 
0.42  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76  0.76 
Note: A blank cell means that “Retirees Cooperation Regime” will be selected. The above figures represent the upper bounds of ρt, under which “Demeny voting + Working generation 
and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” will be selected. For example, the figure 0.48 of (δ, σ) = (0.88, 0.88) means that “Demeny voting + Working generation and 
Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” will be selected if nt＜0.48 and “Retirees Cooperation Regime” will be selected if ρt＞0.48.   
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Table 4： “Retirees Cooperation Regime”⇒“Demeny voting +Working generation and Retirees with children Cooperation Regime” 
  Lifetime tax rate and Utility for each generation by change ofσ : ( t ρ ,δ ) = (0.45, 0.8) 
 
   
σ  
0.4  0.96  0.98  1 
Lifetime tax rate of Retired generation ( ) ( 1 t t− θ )  -0.656    -0.281    -0.289    -0.297   
Lifetime tax rate of Working generation ( ) (t t θ )  0.280    0.006    0.000    -0.007   
Lifetime tax rate of Future generation ( ) ( 1 t t+ θ )  0.610    0.461    0.458    0.454   
Utility of Retired generation with children (
child
t U 1 − )  -0.078    0.033    0.047    0.060   
Utility of Retired generation without children (
nc
t U 1 − )  0.504  0.248  0.254  0.260 
Utility of Working generation ( t U )  -0.526    -0.030    -0.010    0.010   
 
 